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“…we have learned from mistakes, 
and I believe we are in a position to 
make more effective industrial 
policy” (Stiglitz, 2005: 27). 
 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether industrial policy has any place in 
industrialization and economic development of developing countries in the new world 
economy.  We will argue that the answer to this question depends on the development 
objective of the country and the role envisaged for international trade. If the role of 
international trade is to achieve the objective of the integration of developing countries 
into the world economy purely for the sake of integration, the industrial policy is 
irrelevant.  By contrast, if development is the ultimate objective of their integration to the 
world economy what is irrelevant is the current dominate economic philosophy and the 
international rules which govern trade and development. Such rules facilitate 
globalization but they are not particularly conducive to industrialization and development 
of developing countries.  
We have been witnessing two contradictory developments in the world economy 
and international policy during recent decades. On the one hand, the need for 
sophisticated trade and industrial policies has increased; on the other hand the economic 
philosophy has changed against government intervention in the economy. The need for 
industrial policy has increased because the international market has become increasingly 
more concentrated; global production, international trade and technology have become 
more and more dominated by TNCs; technological changes have accelerated and 
production has become more knowledge-intensive. The policy space of developing 
countries has, however, shrunk due to the dominant views of the orthodoxy. Such views 
have been reflected on the conditionalities, imposed on many developing countries by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) or bilateral donors and to a large extent on 
GATT/WTO rules. More recently, they have been propagated through “Washington 
Consensus”. Meanwhile the across-the-board and universal trade liberalization 
implemented by developing countries during recent decades has failed after the failure of 
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across-the-board import-substitution of the preceding decades. Such failures have put 
trade policy as well as trade diplomacy at the cross-roads.  
The failures of the top-down approach to trade and industrial policies through 
which one size-for-all rules are drawn at he international level and imposed on 
developing countries raises a serious question: is not there a need for rethinking trade and 
industrial policies? After arguing for the relevance of industrial policy, we will try to 
present an alternative framework by taking a bottom-up approach in this study. In other 
word, we will present a relevant framework for what is required at the national level to 
catch- up in the process of industrialization and development and, on that basis, argue 
briefly for changes in international rules to make them development oriented. To do so, 
we will first briefly refer to some introductory remarks on the characteristics of the 
international economy in the 21st century and their implications for industrialization of 
developing countries. In the second section, different views on industrial policy will be 
examined. The third section will be allocated to revealing contradictions in WTO rules 
and their detrimental impact on development. Subsequently, we will argue that the 
across-the-board and universal trade liberalization is not justified either on theoretical 
grounds or by historical evidence; by contrast, all successful early and late industrializers 
have gone though an infant industry phase. The contradictory views expressed by the 
World Bank on economic performance of MENA are reviewed briefly before presenting 
an alternative framework for trade and industrial policies. The final section is devoted to 
some remarks on the implication of the alternative framework for international trade 
rules. 
Before proceeding further, let us mention the relations between industrial policy 
and trade policy. Although they are linked, trade policy embraces all sectors of the 
economy, limiting itself to the international flow of goods and services. In other words, 
trade policy is a tool of development strategy in general; industrial policies are concerned 
with all policies, including trade, related to industrial development. Hence, trade policy is 
only one aspect or instrument of industrialization and expansion of exports of 
manufactures. 
 
I. Main features of the world economy; implications  
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for industrialization 
 
Globalization, increasing domination of TNCs in production and international trade and 
rapid technological changes are three main characteristics of the world economy which, 
inter alia, affect the prospects for developing countries’ firms to enter into the world 
market and compete with the established international firms. 
 
Globalization 
Globalization implies the expansion of activities of global firms across frontiers through 
networking and product sharing particularly in the manufacturing sector. Global firms 
locate different stages of production of a specific product in different countries through 
their subsidiaries and affiliates. Therefore, components of a finished product may cross 
different frontiers before being assembled in a particular country and sold in different 
markets1.  
A global firm enjoys a number of advantages vis-à-vis a new comer firm of 
developing country. First, it has home-based advantages related to technology, 
experience, market information, marketing and distribution channels, firm-level 
economies of scale etc. Second, it can benefit from networking, and collaboration with 
other firms. Networking takes place mainly with its own affiliates and allows obtaining 
cheaper sources of inputs, technology, intermediate products, distribution channels etc. 
(Best, 1990: 260). Its global activities also allow expanding the scope of the market to 
enjoy economies of scale, scope and agglomeration. Moreover, a global firm collaborates 
with other firms through international consortia, cross licensing agreements, long-term 
supply and purchase contracts, joint ventures, strategic and technological alliance and 
subcontracting. Collaboration with other firms will allow sharing its activities such as 
R&D, production facilities, marketing, distribution, input procurement, product 
development, and design at the global level without necessarily investing abroad directly 
for these activities (Best, 1990:259-62 and Porter 1990:54).  
In addition to their home country advantages, global firms can benefit from host 
country advantages, such as low wages and local markets by locating their activities in 
different countries .Therefore, they will be in a more favourable competitive position than 
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an independent local firm of a developing country while their importance in world 
economic activities has been increasing. 
 
Domination of large global firms 
Global firms (large TNCs) increasingly dominate production and international trade 
(table 1). The figures in this table overestimate the share of the top firms in output as the 
related data at the firm level are measured in terms of output, but those at the global level 
are quoted in terms of value added. Nevertheless, the data are very telling on the role of 
TNCs in international trade and provide some indications on their role in world industrial 
production and total output. Table 2 presents alternative data on industrial enterprises  
    Insert tables 1 and 2 here 
based on Thomson Financial survey of about 19,000 listed public companies. Again the 
data are not complete, as they do not include all companies, but the table provides some 
information on the degree of concentration of firms at the global level. Accordingly, the 
largest 1270 companies (i.e. 5.1 per cent of the total number of companies surveyed) and 
the largest 100 firms, account for over two-third, and one-fifth of total sales of the 
companies surveyed, respectively. Further, according to the main source, the bulk of 
large companies are located in the main developed countries, particularly the USA. For 
example, half of the companies with 20,000 or more employees are located in the United 
States (accounting for over 62 per cent of their total sales), 22 per cent in six European 
countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy and the 
Netherlands), 8 per cent in Japan and 19 per cent in the rest of the world. Further, the 
United States firms are more concentrated than the rest of the world. Companies with 
20,000 employees and more account for over 85 per cent of sales of all United States 
companies included in the database, as against 67 per cent for the world (Shafaeddin, 
2006.b). 
In recent years, the size of large TNCs has increased due to intensification in 
mergers and acquisition. For example, one-third of the largest US 500 fortune companies 
listed in 1980 were merged by 1990 and another 40 per cent were merged by 1995 
(Shafaeddin, 2006.b). Moreover, in five years between 1997 and 2001, the number of 
cross-boarder M&A with values of over $ 1billion reached 450 cases, almost three times 
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greater than the corresponding number for the preceding ten years. In terms of value, it 
was 4.5 times greater over the same period (Based on UNCTAD, 2005: 9, table 1.1). The 
large global firms dominate almost all industrial activities as well as services 
(Shafaeddin, 2005.a:123-125) and have control over technology particularly that they 
enjoy patent protection through WTO rules  
 
Technology 
During recent decades, technologies have become more sophisticated, more specialized 
and subject to rapid changes. Such development in technology implies that production 
has become more knowledge intensive, skills have become more firm specific and 
specialized, and the period of learning has become longer (Lundvall, 2004). At the same 
time, the newcomer firms run higher investment risks because during the gestation period 
of their investment new technologies may arrive making the existing process obsolete or 
put the existing product out of the market.  As new technology is mainly possessed by 
large TNCs, the barriers to entry are set at a higher level for newcomer firms. 
 
Strategic behaviour of global firms and their Implications  
An important feature of global firms is that in their main activities i.e. networking, intra-
firm trade2, inter-firm cooperation, etc. they do not go through the market (Porter, 1990, 
60-62). Further, while the role of large TNCs in economic activities has increased, the 
role of the government in decision making and allocation of resources has shrunk during 
the recent decades due to economic liberalization. In other words, the relative role of 
large firms in the coordination of economic activities has been increasing against markets 
and governments. 
The large firms coordinate their activities not only outside the market, but they 
also shape the market and create barriers to entry for new comers. They coordinate their 
activities through strategic planning, strategic actions and vertical and horizontal 
relationship with other firms. (Galbraith, 1975; Williamson, 1975; Lazonick, 1991; Best, 
1990 and Porter 1990). Further, they have the capacity to influence production costs, 
prices, technology and the quality of goods they produce.  They can target their markets; 
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influence the market structure and the environment within which they operate thus 
limiting the entry of new firms to the market. 
The firm level economies of scale of large established firms are, in particular, 
important, not only because they are sources of cost advantage (Krugman 1984), but 
more importantly, because they are sources of “strategic behaviour”, “dynamic 
competition” and progressive and cumulative changes over time (Young, 1928). Such a 
Schumpeterian source of dynamic competitive process and power of “creative 
destruction” implies that the ability to export would depend on “comparative strategic 
advantage” rather than comparative cost advantage alone (Best 1990). 
Lazonick (1991) has shown that the combination of technological innovation and 
organizational capabilities, resulting from experience and firm-level economies of scale, 
provides the large established firms with the possibility of pursuing an “innovating 
strategy” based on high fixed costs rather than an “adaptive strategy”. That strategy 
allows them to invest a large amount to develop and utilize productive resources which 
can bring about new products with higher quality and/or new process with lower cost. 
The economies of scale allow them to reduce unit cost of production by lowering price 
and selling more. The decline in the production cost and prices in this case is totally 
different from the production cost related to factor costs.  
In contrast to the established firms a new and independent firm of a developing 
country initially has to follow an “adaptive strategy” which involves lower fixed cost and 
relies on low cost of production emancipating from factor cost advantages. The lack of 
experience, technological capabilities, and marketing and distribution channels as well as 
small size and barriers to entry would not allow a new firm of a developing country to 
follow an “innovative strategy”.  
The successful firms which follow “innovative strategy” have competitive 
advantages vis-à-vis those with “adaptive strategy”. An innovative firm usually runs 
more “productive risks” than an adaptive firm, because there is a risk that other 
innovative firms come up with similar new products. In comparison, the adaptive firm 
produces standard products. Nevertheless, the adaptive firms of developing countries run 
more “competitive risks” than the established firms of developed countries. For the 
standard light manufacturing goods, there is a risk of fallacy of composition and cutthroat 
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price-cutting by other developing countries in addition to the risk of development of new 
products or technology by established “innovative” firms. More importantly, the costs 
and the risks involved in upgrading are particularly greater for the firms of developing 
countries than those of established firms of developed countries as they have inferior 
technological capabilities. 
In short, globalization has changed the nature of competition in the international 
market in three main ways.  First, it has enhanced “strategic competitive advantage” of 
large established firms. Second, it has intensified the process of Schumpeterian 
“Dynamic competition” and “creative distraction”.  In such a process firms are 
continuously active in innovation, product development, quality improvement, shortening 
of delivery time, etc.  As a result, the role of “non-price attributes” of products in 
competitive advantages has increased.  Finally, the growing size, their control of 
technology, experience and strategic behaviour of established firms place them in a 
superior “competitive advantage” vis-à-vis newcomer and independent firms of 
developing countries. Such attribute limits prospects of these firms for entry into the 
international market because unlike the established firms of developed countries only 
cheap labour and/or raw materials are their main source of competitive advantage.  
The increased cost of technology, the prolonged length of learning, the augmented 
risks of investments3-all these factors have increased the need for government support of 
infant industries/firms in a developing country unless integration into the world economy 
through the FDI channel is feasible and conducive to industrialization. In theory, there 
are two main methods through which governments can provide support to infant 
industries. One is creating an environment which contributes to prevalence of external 
economies; the other is the provision of supports for specific industries and firms. 
External economies can shift the cost curve of firms downward. Specific support can 
enhance their earnings for a given cost curve in a particular period. External economies 
can arise from functional intervention in the economy through general government 
investment in education, training, infrastructure, institutions and back-up services. It can 
also arise from collective efficiencies resulting from industrial districts and clustering 
both of which require government support4. While external economies are important, 
development of a specific infant industry requires provision of temporary support to that 
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industry either through subsidies or imposition of tariffs or some other means. In practice, 
the policy space of developing countries has been shrinking in recent decades restricting 
their ability to use such measures. 
Of course, the process of globalization improves, under certain conditions, the 
possibilities and opportunities for developing countries to enter the international market 
through FDI by global firms. The question is whether development through FDI path, 
even where feasible, would allows a country to deepen its industrialization or leaves the 
country locked in a pattern of specialization based on static comparative cost advantage. 
 
II. Different Approaches to Industrial Policies 
 
There are two main approaches to industrial policy: that of neo-liberals and their 
opponents. The neo-liberal views are expressed through Washington Consensus, IFIs, 
and contained to some extent in WTO rules. According to the orthodox approach, 
industrial policy has no place in economic development. The WTO rules limits the use of 
industrial policy, and developed countries aim at limiting it even further in the Doha 
Round of trade negotiation and beyond. A number of scholars, however, believe that 
industrial policy is an important tool of development, but the approach they take is a top 
down approach. Let us say a few words about each, but concentrate on the WTO rules 
which are most directly relevant to the question of policy space of developing countries.  
 
The orthodoxy and WTO rules 
Since early 1980s, there have been changes in the dominant economic philosophy 
in favour of neo-liberalism, which do not favour government involvement in economic 
activities beyond some functional intervention in the form of investment in education, 
health and securities etc. (See e.g. World Bank, 1987 and 1993). Their argument is that 
development of a country should be left basically to the operation of market forces; trade 
liberalization would change the structures of incentives in favour of exports and attract 
private investment, including FDI, to the areas in which a country has comparative 
advantage leading to industrialization and growth (see Shafaeddin, 2006.a for a survey). 
This process, however, has its own limitations in enhancing industrialisation of 
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developing countries (see below); further, it increases the risks and vulnerability of these 
countries to decisions of global firms in re-location of plants from one country to another. 
WTO rules limit policy space of developing countries in a number of ways 
including: 
? The TRIPS agreement restricts application and transfer of technology to 
developing countries and their development of generic drugs by protecting 
intellectual property rights, limiting the use of patented technologies or products 
(patents are protected for 25 years) and restricting the government ability to 
demand a firm to license a patent to other firms. 
? The TRIMs agreement restricts the imposition of “performance requirements” on 
foreign firms including the local content, export requirements and trade balancing. 
It also forbids “national preference” i.e. preference for local products in 
government procurement. 
? GATS exposes domestic companies to sever competition with established foreign 
companies through requirements for most “favoured nations”, “national 
treatment” in the use of inputs, local employees, and access to local market, etc5. 
? The Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) prohibits the 
use of targeted subsidies for supporting domestic industries and export expansion 
(except for agricultural goods). 
Wade (2005) summarizing the impact of the first three agreement, concludes that: “With 
a touch of hyperbole the agreements could be called a slow-motion Great Train Robbery” 
(Ibid: 89). Nevertheless, the detrimental impact of the ASCM on manufacturing 
production and exports is not any less than the adverse effects of those agreements. 
Subsidies have been a major instrument of infant industry protection and export 
expansion in many developing countries, particularly East Asian ones. Under Uruguay 
Round Agreements (URAs), subsidies provided for the expansion of exports and export 
supply capabilities are not allowed (ASCM, articles 3 and 8). Article 3 of the Agreement 
prohibits subsidies to be paid to firms (except for agricultural products) “upon export 
performance” and "upon the use of domestic over imported goods" (inputs). Definition of 
subsidies for export performance includes “direct subsidy", currency retention, 
preferential internal transport and freight charges on export shipment, as against domestic 
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shipment and preferential provision of "imported or domestic products or services for use 
in the production of exported goods" (ASCM, annex I).6
While according to paragraph 2.1.a, a subsidy is prohibited if it is "specific", i.e. it is 
limited to specific enterprises or industries, according to para. 2.3, all subsidies falling 
under the provisions of article 3 are regarded as specific. Hence, even if all industries 
were provided with subsidies tied to export performance, or which favour domestically 
produced goods, the subsidy would be regarded as specific. The implication of this article 
is that a country cannot support its infant industries, whether or not for exports, either 
across-the-board or on a selective basis, when the subsidy is tied to export performance. 
Paragraphs 8.2.a, 8.2.b and 8.2.c, however, provide some exceptions to the subsidy 
rule. For example, Para. 8.2.a provides exceptions to the specificity clause. It covers 
research activities (R&D) undertaken by firms and/or research and educational 
establishments, up to 75 per cent of costs of industrial research, or 50 per cent of the costs 
of pre-competitive development activity. Para. 8.2.b allows for “non-specific” assistance 
to a country’s disadvantaged regions, provided that clear and objective criteria is used in 
the definition of such regions. The criteria should be based on development indicators, 
which should at least cover a measure of income or employment. Accordingly, the 
income per capita of the region should be lower than the 85 per cent of the average for 
the country. The unemployment rate should be at least 110 per cent of the country 
average.  
Paragraph 8.2.c allows, under certain conditions, assistance for the adaptation of 
existing facilities to new environmental requirements of up to 20 per cent of the related 
cost on a one-time basis, provided it is available to all firms concerned (Shafaeddin, 
2005.a)  
 
The opponents 
The existence of such exceptional clauses has led Amsden (2001 and 2005) to 
consider the possibility of applying industrial policy within the framework of WTO. She 
argues that although WTO restricts policy space of developing countries, there are still 
some room for manoeuvrings in the use of industrial policy. For example, she refers to 
three specific non-actionable subsidies mentioned above, the use of “trade-balancing”, as 
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an indirect export requirement, and development of mid-and high-technology industries 
through development of science parks (Ibid:22/)7. Moreover, she refers to the need for 
“getting the control mechanism right” to guide and stimulate the private sector in certain 
direction; in each case the instruments of promotion “…must be tied to monitorable 
performance standard and operate within a reciprocal control mechanism that disciplines 
all parties involved in industrial expansion”. 
A number of points worth mentioning with respect to the Amsden’s proposal.  First 
and most importantly, is that the policy space of developing countries is being limited not 
only by WTO rules, but also by IFIs and bilateral donors. Therefore, even when the use 
of a policy tool is allowed under WTO rule, the SAPs, SPs or even bilateral donors, 
would not necessarily leave a developing country to implement it. Second, under current 
WTO rules the “control mechanism” (the performance requirements) is limited as 
mentioned earlier. Third, the provision on subsidies to R&D activities was for a trial 
period of 5 years and is no longer applicable. Trade balancing requirement is allowed 
only in accordance with “the balance of payments clause” i.e. for a limited period when a 
country faces balance of payments problems. Otherwise, it is forbidden under TRIMs 
Agreement.  
Fourth, developed countries are trying to limit the policy space of developing 
countries even further through the Doha Round and beyond (see below). Finally, the 
problem is that not only WTO rules are not conducive to development, but they also 
suffer from many contradictions in design and in implementation of the agreed rules by 
developed countries. In fact, certain GATT/WTO rules limit policy space of developing 
countries but leaves the hands of governments of developed countries, relatively 
speaking, free (see below). 
The only possibility under WTO rules to encourage exports indirectly, not 
mentioned by Amsden, is locating export activities in the “disadvantage” regions. In this 
case they could benefit from non-specific subsidies provided to all industries in those 
regions. Nevertheless, the use of such a mechanism would be possible for a short period, 
because as more industries are located in such regions, they would not remain 
disadvantaged8. 
According to Rodrik (2004), rumours of “industrial policy’s death” are exaggerated. 
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 The reality is that industrial policies have run rampant during the last decades-and 
nowhere more so than in those economies that have steadily adopted the agenda of 
orthodox reform. If this fact has escaped attention, it is because the preferential 
policies in question have privileged exports and foreign investment,- the two fetishes 
of the Washington Consensus era-and because their advocates have called them 
strategies of “outward orientation” and other similar sounding names instead of 
industrial policies (Rodrik, Ibid:28-29). 
 
Preferences given to export processing zones and incentives provided to FDI are among 
main examples of policies favouring exports and FDI because it is presumed that 
externalities reside in exports and foreign direct investment’ (Ibid: 30). 
Rodrik argues that the market does not bring about industrialization on its own, 
and that as market failures prevails government intervention is required. It is in this 
context that he advocates the need to ‘get the policy process right’ and maintains that this 
can be done, through a ‘discovery process’ by which ‘private and public actors come 
together to solve problems, including those caused by market failure, in the productive 
sphere, each side learning about opportunities and constraints faced by other’ (ibid.: 3). In 
such a process ‘firms and government learn about underlying costs and opportunities and 
engage in strategic coordination’ to remedy market failures which restrict self-discovery 
(ibid.: 10). Referring to external constraints and the restrictions on policy space imposed 
by international rules and conditionalities, Rodrik, like Amsden, argues that (external) 
restrictions are exaggerated; there is also still some room for manoeuvre to implement 
industrial policy.  
Rodrik’s proposal on a mechanism for public–private collaboration is welcome, 
but it is not new. Public-private cooperation has worked relatively well in East Asia (see, 
for example, Amsden, 1989; Shafaeddin, 2004a; Wade, 1990). The problem with this 
Approach is to submit to fait-à-complet. Further, as already mentioned the remaining 
policy space of developing countries will be further limited through Doha Round if 
developing countries agree with the proposals made by developed countries. 
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Some other opponents of neo-liberalism advocate a more radical approach on 
industrial policy. For example, Lall (2004) refers to rapidity and complexity of technical 
changes, globalization and market failure in technological capability building, and 
concludes that developing competitive capabilities requires direct and indirect 
government intervention. Both selective and functional government interventions are 
required to address market failures which create obstacles to ‘capability building’ for 
industrialization and development. Attraction of FDI, he adds, also requires local 
capabilities; this is a reason only a limited number of developing countries have attracted 
FDI. Even where such capabilities exist, the contribution of FDI to industrial 
development and upgrading is limited; its coverage does not often go beyond simple 
processing and labour intensive activities unless local capabilities are upgraded rapidly. 
There are, in fact, a body of literature showing that FDI has not involved much 
spill-over in developing countries (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2004, Hanson, 2001) 
Nevertheless, while Lall advocates the need for the creation of space for industrial policy 
in developing countries, he concludes that it is not feasible under WTO rules to develop 
and upgrade the necessary capabilities because of restrictions imposed by WTO rules. 
This is again a passive approach. 
In contrast to Lall, Singh (2005) and Wade (2005), argue for some changes in the 
WTO rules to provide developing countries with Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT). Nevertheless, they still follow a sort of top down approach. What is needed is a 
totally different framework which would allow for differential treatment of developing 
countries “as a rule” not as exceptions to the rules i.e. a type of SDT currently requested 
by developing countries.9 According to WTO, Various Multilateral Agreements 
contain145 SDT provisions of which 107 were adopted at the conclusion of UR (Singh, 
ibid: 237). Further, the July 2004 Text of the Doha Round also refers to the issue 
frequently. Nevertheless, the main concern of SDT measure in the UR has been “to assist 
developing countries in implementation of the WTO disciplines” (ibid: 237). Moreover, 
the SDT provisions which are already approved are not taken seriously by developed 
countries as they are voluntary and not legally binding. There were also some provisions 
which in fact provide SDTs for developed countries, such as the textile agreement, 
ASCM Agreement and Agricultural Agreements (see below). After all, despite the 
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emphasize in the July text on SDT and less than reciprocity in favour of developing 
countries, in practice, developed countries are trying to impose unfavourable terms on 
developing countries during the Doha Round negotiation.  The whole philosophy behind 
WTO rules needs to be changed as it suffers from contradictions and double standards 
detrimental to developing countries. 
 
III. Contradictions and double standards in GATT/WTO rules  
 
The GATT/WTO rules suffer from contradictions in design and contradictions 
between the agreed rules and their implementation by developed countries as mentioned 
before. Furthermore, developed countries have been showing further double standards 
during the so-called “Doha Development Round”. One wonders “…why are there two 
standards for what is ‘fair? Or ?unfair? trade practices” (Stiglitz, 2005: 17).  
Design 
According to the preamble to GATT (1949), trade liberalization is the objective of 
the Agreement. Let us assume for the moment that universal trade liberalization is 
conducive to industrialization and development of developing countries. Yet, one can 
find many general and specific “animal farm” type exceptions in GATT/WTO rules in 
favour of developed countries in contradiction with this general principal of trade 
liberalization. With respect to general contradictions, first of all, the GATT/WTO rules 
aim at reducing government intervention in the flow of trade, but are silenct about 
eliminating, or at least reducing, the monopoly, or oligopoly, power of TNCs. In fact, if 
anything the governments’ controls on these companies have been relaxed through 
TRIMs and GATS as mentioned above. According to Wade: 
These [international] regulations are not about limiting companies’ options, as 
“regulations” normally connotes. Rather they are about limiting the options of 
developing country governments to constrain the options of companies operating or 
hoping to operate within their borders. In effect, the new regulations are designed to 
expand the options of developed country firms to enter and exit markets more easily, 
with fewer restrictions and obligations, and to lock in appropriation of technological 
rents”(Wade, 2005: 80). 
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   Second, trade in agricultural products has been so far excluded from 
liberalization in favour of developed countries. 
 Third, while trade in manufactured goods was supposed to be  liberalized, labour 
intensive products of main interest to developing countries have been subject to special 
restrictions (e.g. textiles and clothing has been subject to MFA until recently) or tariff 
peaks and tariff escalation on products of interests to developing countries. 
There are also specific contradictions in various GATT/WTO agreements which  
favour developed countries but are detrimental to the interest of developing countries. For 
example, as mentioned earlier, the ASCM allowed subsidization of R&D, the main infant 
activity of interest to developed countries, and agriculture, and not for manufactured 
export, an infant activity of interest to developing countries. In the Agricultural 
Agreement , subsidies used by developed countries (as in R&D, crop insurance, and so 
on) are allowed, but those most used by developing countries (e.g. input and land 
improvement subsidies) are subject to countermeasures (Das, 1999: 157)10. Furthermore, 
a long period (25 years) of infant industry protection of new technologies and new 
products is allowed under TRIPs, but temporary infant industry protection of new 
industries, or new export activities, in developing countries is not allowed ( See 
Shafaeddin, 2005, chapter 8 for details). Again in the TRIPs agreement, while the 
developing countries obligations on the rules governing patents are binding, their rights 
are not. By contrast, developed countries’ rights are binding, but their obligations are not 
(Wade, 2005:83-4)11   
 
Implementations 
Developed countries have not fully implemented the rules to which they have agreed 
in GATT/WTO. Such are the lack of proper implementations of the Differential and 
Preferential Treatment of developing and particularly least developed countries, the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), the Agreement on Agriculture (the so-called 
cotton scandal is only one example) and the abuse of anti-dumping rules and safe-guard 
measures. Above all, main developed countries have provided extensive targeted 
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supported for their industries and firms against the WTO rules (See Shafaeddin, 2005: 
Chapter 8 for details).  
Doha Round 
The Doha Round is supposed to be “development round”. The outcome of the Round has 
not been decided yet, and the text of the Hong Kong Declaration of December 2005 is 
vague in many respects, particularly on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA). 
Nevertheless, many of the proposals which have already been made by developed 
countries are in contradictions with the stated objectives of the Round. Such 
contradictions are best expressed in nutshell by a delegation from a developing country in 
Hong Kong during the WTO meeting of December 2005: “The developed countries talk 
in the plenary halls of a round for free for developing countries. Then they move into the 
green room and continue to ask for a round for free, this time for themselves.”(Oxfam, 
2005:8). 
 Generally speaking, GATT/WTO rules and decisions recognize the need to take into 
account the special need of individual developing countries and industries, (e.g. Article 
XXVIIbis of GATT 1994, para8 of Article XXXVI, part IV, GATT 1994, para 4 and 8 of 
Annex B to the July 2004 Package)12. In the particular case of NAMA which is of our 
particular interest here, the July 2004 package refers to principles of “less than full 
reciprocity” and “flexibility” in favour of developing countries (e.g. paragraph 8 of 
Annex B of the text of July Package). In practice, however, the proposals made by 
developed countries are neither conducive to development nor consistent with those 
principles. In fact, they push for universal and across-the-board trade liberalization  
According, all countries are supposed to apply the same formula to cut average tariffs 
rates drastically and reduce their dispersion by binding 95 per cent of their individual 
tariff13 lines at the same rate at the low levels . For example, the USA proposed cutting 
tariffs to 8 per cent by 2010 and reducing them to zero by 2015. Certain sectors are 
proposed to be subject to zero tariffs immediately upon conclusion of the Doha Round. 
The EU has proposed non-linear cuts in tariffs according to the Swiss formula14 and a 
low and uniform coefficient of 10 chosen for both developed and developing countries. 
Further it has proposed a tariff cap of 15 per cent for developing and 10 per cent for 
developed countries for binding all industrial tariff lines. The Swiss formula proposed by 
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EU, and approved in Honk Kong despite the opposition of the majority of developing 
countries, has four main characteristics:  
? The higher the initial tariff rate, the higher the rate of reduction in tariff; 
? The lower the coefficient, the higher the rate of reduction in tariff; 
? For high tariff rates the rate of reduction in tariffs are higher than the rate of 
reduction in tariff when simple linear formula( according to which the same 
percentage reduction is applied at all tariff lines is applied); 
? It “has lower rates of percentage reduction than those generated by a tariff 
independent linear reduction in a certain range of low tariff rates” (WTO, 
ibid: 2). 
Although the coefficients of the formula for developing and developed countries are still 
subject to negotiation, the proposals so far made is not in the interest of developing 
countries. As initial tariffs for developing countries are well higher than that of developed 
countries, they would be subject to significantly greater reduction in their rates not only 
in absolute terms but also in percentage terms. For example, if the EU proposal is 
approved, a tariff rate of 5 per cent for developed countries will be reduced to 3.33-a 
reduction of 33 per cent or 1.67 percentage points. By contrast, a tariff rate of 60 percent 
for developing countries will be reduced to 8.8-or a deduction of 85 per cent, or 51.2 
percentage points. For higher initial tariff rates, the new rate would not exceed the cap of 
10 per cent (SUNS, 1November 2005). This maximum rate will also apply to all unbound 
tariffs after tariff cuts and binding. 
 The immediate effect of the proposal by developed countries is that developing 
countries imports of industrial goods will increase more than their exports as indicated by 
results of simulations (Fernandez de Cordoba, et.al. 2004). More, importantly, it has a 
significant detrimental long-term effect on their industrialization. The industrial sector of 
developing countries is, unlike that of developed countries, underdeveloped, thus they 
need to apply higher tariffs to some of their industries than developed countries. 
Therefore, the low tariffs rates, as proposed by developed countries, will make them lose 
an important policy tool for upgrading their industrial capacity. Further, binding of tariffs 
at low levels would not allow developing countries to raise them beyond the (low) bound 
level at the time of balance of payments problems (Shafaeddin, 2006.c).  
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 There are some other evidences of double standards by developed countries. For 
example, while they try to impose caps on industrial tariffs, they refuse to do so for 
agricultural products. Similarly, while demanding a significant cut in the industrial tariffs 
of developing countries, they proposed only a very conservative cut in their agricultural 
tariffs and abolishment of agricultural export subsidy by 2013, but no change in domestic 
support to agriculture which is far more important than export subsidy. Further, the EU 
proposal on agriculture exempts European sensitive products from steep cuts, and asked 
for special safeguard measures for a number of their agricultural products (beef, poultry, 
butter, fruits, vegetables and sugar). More importantly, both the EU and USA have   
made their conservative proposals for liberalization of agricultural trade subject to drastic 
liberalization of both industrial products and services by developing countries and judged 
by the outcome of the Honk Kong meeting, they have succeeded so far as para 24 of the 
Hong Kong Declaration calls, however vague, for balanced and proportionate market 
access for agriculture and NAMA in the negotiation. 
 In short, as an African delegation commented: “quite simply, we do not detect the 
political will of other Members to strengthen special and differential treatment provisions 
to make them more precise, effective and operational, as we all agreed to do in Doha”      
(SUNS, 31, October 2005 ). The lack of political “will” is not, however, the only 
problem. The philosophy behind “trade liberalization hypothesis” suffers from theoretical 
shortcomings. 
 
 
 
IV. Shortcomings of  
the theory behind “trade liberalization hypothesis” 
 
 “the argument against industrial policy is 
based on a naïve reading of economic 
theory and misreading of economic 
history” (Stiglitz, 2005:25). 
 
The philosophy and the theory behind Washington Consensus, trade policies dictated by 
IFIs (through SAPs and SPs), i.e. the across-the-board and universal trade liberalization, 
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which also governs the GATT/WTO rules to a large extent, is not conducive to 
industrialization and development of developing countries. Let us for simplicity refer to 
the idea of “universal and across-the-board trade liberalization as “trade liberalization 
hypothesis”. We will argue in this section that this hypothesis is not justified by 
economic theory. 
The orthodoxy argues against government intervention in the economy in general as 
mentioned before. The theoretical argument against government intervention in 
production and trade is based mainly on the premise that markets are competitive and 
function well and there is no market failure, but government failure is pervasive. In the 
particular case of international trade, policy reform has been envisaged as synonymous 
with “uniform”-across-the-board import liberalization, applicable “universally” to all 
developing countries. This is a general theoretical abstraction which is, in turn, based on 
the theory of comparative cost advantage according to which universal free trade will 
lead to an efficient reallocation of world resources. This theory can predict and explain, 
under free trade and certain assumptions, the division of labour between industrial 
countries and developing countries and the specialization of the later in production and 
exports of primary commodities and labour intensive products. But it, whether in its static 
or so-called dynamic version, can not explain the process of “caching-up” and upgrading 
by late-comers. 
The theory of comparative cost advantage is based on unrealistic assumptions 
such as the existence of competitive and perfect internal and international markets, the 
small size and “passivity” of firms, no “market inadequacy”15, constant returns to scale, 
no externalities and no other causes of market failure. Moreover, according to this theory, 
all countries are at the same level of technological development, and technology is 
readily and freely available to their firms, a mix of goods and services are the same in all 
countries and each product is produced with the same technology in different countries. 
Further, as all firms are small, they do not play an active role in pricing, technological 
development, capacity building and the learning process. Full employment, mobility of 
factors of production between industries, lack of uncertainty and risks, are other 
unrealistic assumptions of that theoretical abstraction. Accordingly, there is no need for 
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government intervention, whether functional or selective, as no sector or industry plays a 
particular role in providing positive externalities. 
The afore-mentioned assumptions related to internal market structure are 
particularly unrealistic for low-income countries and those at the early stages of 
industrialization where markets are missing or market failure is pervasive and the 
industrial production and export base is usually very small. In these countries the existing 
industrial capacity often reflects the production of scattered, light manufactured goods, 
produced at high cost owing to across-the-board import substitution and low capacity 
utilization; the latter being due to a shortage of foreign exchange and skilled manpower.  
Although sometimes they pay lip service to the question of growth, the main 
concern of neo-liberals is the allocative efficiency.16For example, John Williamson, the 
initiator of the Washington Consensus literature, admits  that “none of the ideas spawned 
by … development literature … plays an essential role in motivating the Washington 
Consensus …” (see e.g. Williamson, 1990: 19). In other words, what is recommended by 
the orthodoxy, does not contribute to “catching up”, industrialization and development 
beyond a short-term gain achieved through allocative efficiency. 
Concentration on the allocative efficiency was in fact, one of three main 
interrelated issues in Adam Smith theory of international trade which has been the basis 
of the neo-classical theory of trade and the “trade liberalization hypothesis”. The first is 
Smith's “focussing attention on the allocative functions of the markets to the exclusion of 
their creative functions – as an instrument for transmitting impulses to economic change” 
(Kaldor, 1972: 1240). The second is his concerns with “interchangeable value” 
[international trade] as against “productive power” [economic development] (List, 1856: 
253). Third, Adam Smith introduced his universal theory of free trade for “cosmopolitan 
economy”, i.e. the economy of mankind as a whole believing that free trade would 
maximize the welfare of the world economy as a whole. He, in fact, did not distinguish 
differences between the interest of individuals, and mankind in general. He ignored the 
fact that some nations may give more weight to their own welfare than to the collective 
welfare of humanity. Yet, he thought what was in the interest of Britain was also in the 
interest of the world as a whole (List, Ibid: 245–6, 74 and 261).  
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A number of famous neo-classical economists do admit that free trade is an 
“ideal” as the theory of comparative advantage is based on abstract assumptions 
(Haberler, 1950:227; Corden, 1974:7-8; Samuelson1938:226 and 1939:195 and Viner 
(1953:4-5). For example, according to Samuelson: “some trade is better than no trade, but 
that does not necessarily imply that free trade is the optimum for any country” 
(Samuelon1938:266)17 Jacob Viner (1953: 4–5) correctly maintains that Smith and other 
classical economists took a cosmopolitan approach because they thought that what was in 
the interest of England was also in the interest of the world as a whole. Viner admits that 
what was relevant to their time and country may not necessarily be relevant for other 
times and other countries, and, in particular, it may not be relevant for “economically less 
advanced countries” at any time. Hence, ‘it is today always necessary, as it was for the 
English classical economists, to be perfectly clear whether we are considering a problem, 
say, commercial policy from a national or from a cosmopolitan point of view’ (Viner 
1953: 5). Despite such reservations by famous Neo-classical economists, in the end free 
trade remains the “religion” of neo-liberals. Such an ideology is, for example, evident in 
some of the documents of the World Bank on MENA. 
 
V. World Bank’s evaluation of economic performance of MENA 
 
The Bank praises the socio-economic performance of the MENA region between 
1965-1985 as unprecedented in terms of growth of output, poverty reduction, income 
equality, reduction in mortality rate, increase in life expectancy, literacy levels and school 
enrolment (World Bank, 2004:14). By contrast, it regards the economic performance of 
the region disappointing in more recent decades particularly in areas of trade and private 
investment and attributes its weak performance to weak policies and  weak governance 
(World Bank, 2003.a:1-2; 2003.b:2, 8-9 and 10) and high tariffs (World Bank, 2005:156-
162). Accordingly, it advocates deepening and accelerating market oriented reform and a 
shift to export-oriented activities (Ibid: 2) as trade is “likely to be a key source of growth 
in MENA region in the next decade and beyond” (Ibid: 4). The Reports, however, suffer 
from some important contradictions. First, it is not clear on what ground, it is assumed 
that the governance capacity of these countries in general has become weaker during 
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1980s-1990s than the previous decades. In fact, the World Bank shows that the quality of 
governance in the region increases with the income level (World Bankk, 2003, b: 5). As 
income in all countries of the region has increased during the period concerned, although 
slowly, the capacity of the governance could not have become weaker. One should search 
for the reason for their sluggish performance elsewhere. 
Secondly, while slow growth performance of the region is attributed to high 
tariffs, it is not clear why “resource-rich, importing labour” countries [a number of oil 
exporting countries], which according to the Bank have had significantly low tariffs rates 
(their median tariff rates was around 5 per cent) (World Bank, 2005:160, figure D.3), 
have shown according to the Bank (Ibid: 156-162) the worse growth performance. 
Thirdly, on the one hand referring to a few successful cases of china, India and 
Vietnam, the Bank argues that “..the content, pace, and sequencing of reform should be 
tailored to specific settings” (World Bank 2003.a:5): 
…China, India and Vietnam which have often undertaken …incomplete (or non-
orthodox) approaches [read approaches different from those recommended by 
IFIs] to liberalizing trade and investment. But they have produced outcomes that 
are often better than in other cases where reform have been orthodox and 
complete (as in Argentina and Brazil) (Ibid: 5). 
 
It is not clear if “incomplete” and non-orthodox reform succeed in China, India and 
Vietnam, why it did not succeed in Argentina and Brazil and why it should not succeed in 
MENA and elsewhere. It is not clear because after admitting the success of the “non-
orthodox approach” and recommending tailoring the “content [our italics], pace and 
sequence of the reform to specific settings, the Bank immediately advocates its own 
typical policy package. Accordingly, it recommends “across-the-board”, uniform and 
“accelerated” (except for the sector in which job losses are likely to be significant) trade 
and financial liberalization, significant devaluation, deregulation of domestic and foreign 
investment, etc. (Ibid: 6 and 7). It is emphasized that “F[f]aster growth of output, 
productivity, and job is available if MENA countries tackle deep seated barriers to trade 
and investment” (Ibid: 17). For example a “magic” uniform tariff rate of 10 per cent is 
proposed for labour-abundant, resource reach countries of the region (Ibid: 10). 
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The report does not pay enough attention to a crucial difference between the 
reforms in China, India and Vietnam and their contrast with those implemented in 
Argentina and Brazil. The former group of countries, as well as other East Asian 
countries, have designed their trade reform programmes-at least until recently on their 
own- as a part of their long-run industrial policy and liberalized selectively and gradually. 
By contrast, Argentina and Brazil, and many other developing countries, have been under 
the influence of Washington Consensus or the pressure of IFIs and embarked on a shock 
therapy and across-the-board trade liberalization. Let us also mention that the rapid 
development in the MENA region during 1965-85 was partly due to growth of oil 
exporting countries of the region as a result of increase in oil revenues. Nevertheless, 
1965-85 was the period during which the Governments of the region intervened in the 
economy heavily and most countries were engaged in import substitutions 
industrialization18. By contrast, during more recent decades they have been influenced 
more than before by external pressure, interference or advice in their policy makings as 
mentioned before.  
In another report, the World Bank (2005) is blunt in self-criticism of its own 
policy recommendations on economic reform during the last quarter of century, yet in the 
final analysis “openness” remains a must for all developing countries irrespective of their 
level of development. For example, it is admitted that “reform policies of 1990 did not 
provide incentive for expansion of production capacity”; that market failure prevails 
(p.10); that “one size fits all” policies fail (p.12); that means [reform] were mistaken for 
goals [growth] (p.11), etc.: 
In retrospect, it is clear [our italic] that in the 1990s we often mistook efficiency 
gains for growth. The “one size fits all” policy reform approach to economic 
growth and the belief in “best practices” exaggerated the gains from improved 
resource allocation and their dynamic repercussions, and proved to be both 
theoretically incomplete and contradicted the evidence[our italics]. Expectations 
that gains in growth would be won entirely through policy improvements were 
unrealistic. Means were often mistaken for goals-that is, improvements in policies 
were mistaken for growth strategies, as if improvements in policies were an end in 
themselves (ibid: 11). 
 
Further, recognition is made of the risk in indiscriminate opening of capital account (Ibid: 
14), the importance of “country specificities” in drawing policies (Ibid: 15), the role of 
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trail and error and experiment (p.16). Nevertheless, in the end the idea of universal free 
trade seems to be sacred: “trade openness [remains] a key element of successful strategy” 
(Ibid: 18) and (protection is not good for economic growth” (Ibid: 135). The only 
qualification to this sacred formula, which is to be universally applied to all countries 
irrespective of their level of development, is that it has to be combined with other policies 
i.e. it should be a part of a comprehensive package (ibid:18-21 and 135) which are mainly 
elements of Structural Adjustment Programmes.  
 
VI. Evidence from history and experience of developing countries 
 
 “We cannot go back to the past. But 
neither should we fail to recognize 
the failures of the present.”(Stiglitz, 
2005:32).  
 
Not only, the theoretical approach of the Bank and the Washington Consensus to 
“openness” is shaky, but the empirical evidence provided by the experience of other 
developing countries which have undertaken across-the-board and universal trade has 
also been disappointing. The history of industrialization of both early industrialzers and 
latecomers teaches us a couple of important general lessons. First, with the exception of 
Honk Kong (Province of China), no country has managed to industrialize without going 
through infant industry protection phase. In all successful cases government intervention, 
both functional and selective, in the flow of trade and in the economy in general has 
played a crucial role. Second, across-the-board import substitution and prolonged 
protection have also led to inefficiency and failure.  Third, the experience of premature 
and across-the-board trade liberalization, whether during the colonial era or in more 
recent decades, has been disappointing. Let us say a few words about each.  
 The experience of all successful countries, whether early industrilzers or late-
comers- including Great Britain-indicates that industrialization began on selective basis 
and continued in the same manner until the industrial sector was consolidated. Further, 
when their industries matured, they began to liberalize selectively and gradually. In the 
case of USA, when the country tried to liberalize pre-maturely in 1847-61, the industrial 
sector suffered and the country had to revert to protectionism against imports from Great 
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Britain. In all successful cases government intervention was not confined to trade, the 
state intervened through other means; trade policy was not the only contributory factor to 
their success. The government directly and indirectly intervened, in particular, to develop 
the necessary institutions and infrastructure and promote investment. In all cases 
industrialization was supported by growth in agricultural sector. Corn Law in Great 
Britain and protection of rice production in East Asian countries are only two examples. 
While different countries did not follow exactly the same path, all learned from the 
experience of others ; USA learned from GB, Germany from USA, Japan from Germany 
and Republic of Korea from Japan, etc.(See Shafaeddin,1998)  
  
 Finally, in all main early industrializers-GB, USA, France, Germany- when the 
industrial sector was matured, they used tariffs as a tool of bargaining in trade 
negotiations or pushed for opening markets in other countries. In the 19th century 5 per 
cent rules were imposed on colonies and semi-colonies through “unequal” bilateral 
treaties and or through force (e.g. the imposition of the opium war on China). During 
recent decades, developing countries have been pushed through multilateral organizations 
and bilateral trade agreements to open their markets (Chang, 2005.a:10 and Shafaeddin, 
1998)19. Further, limiting the policy space of the colonies, in the 19th century, was not 
confined to 5 per cent rule. “High value-added manufacturing activities were outlawed in 
the colonies and competing export items from colonies were banned. Instead, production 
of primary products was encouraged” (Chang, Ibid: 7). During recent decades, tariff 
peaks and escalations and arbitrary anti-dumping measures were among means of 
restricting imports of high-value added products to developed countries. 
 The results of forced liberalization on colonies and semi-colonies in the 19the 
century was slow growth; “in all parts of developing world. Economic growth accelerated 
after the end of imperialism” [when they regained their policy autonomy] (Chang, 
2005.b:32)20.  
 The available evidence on the impact of across-the-board liberalisation on 
developing countries during recent decades is similarly disappointing despite the fact that  
the neo-liberals and the neo-liberal oriented institutions try to convince us to the contrary 
(see e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995)21. The studies presented by the neo-liberals, however, 
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suffer from many methodological problems. In fact, the results of cross-sectional studies 
have revealed no, or little, evidence that there was any statistically significant correlation 
between trade barriers or openness with economic growth in recent decades (Rodriguez 
and Rodrik , 2001; Wacziarg and Welch, 2003; ECLAC, 2002). More importantly, 
UNDP( 2003) finds a positive correlation between a country’s tariff rate and growth rate 
for the period 1990s. There is also some evidence that trade liberalization has led to de-
industrialization of low income countries, particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa (Bennel, 
1998; Shafaeddin, 1995; Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 2000; and Thoborn 2001)22.  
Not only the experience of across-the-board and universal trade liberalization has 
been disappointing, but the result of the economic reform in general proposed by neo-
liberal has been unsatisfactory. According to Professor Stiglitz: “Today the inadequacies 
of Washington Consensus reform are apparent…”(Stiglits, 2005:31). He maintains that  
stabilization policies do not ensure either growth or stability; the benefits of trade 
liberalization are questionable particularly that “workers move from low-productivity 
jobs to unemployment” instead of moving to high-productivity jobs; capital market 
liberalization does not necessarily leads to faster growth and exposes the countries to 
higher risks; privatization often leads to higher prices of utilities; the adverse  social 
consequences of wrong policies imposed on developing countries has been seen in many 
countries (Stiglitz, Ibid:200516-18). 
 In a study of a sample of about 50 developing countries for the period 1980-2000, 
the present author has shown that the results of trade liberalization have been mixed 
(Shafaeddin, 2005.a and 2006.a). Twenty countries experienced rapid expansion of 
exports of manufactured goods. In a minority of these countries, mostly East Asian NIEs, 
rapid export growth was also accompanied with fast expansion of industrial supply 
capacity and upgrading. In these countries, at least until recently, economic reform, 
particularly trade liberalization, has taken place gradually and selectively as part of a 
long-term industrial policy after they had reached a certain level of industrial maturity 
and development. By contrast, the performance of the remaining countries, mostly in 
Africa and Latin America (majority cases), has not been satisfactory. These countries 
embarked, in the main, in the 1980s, on a process of structural reform including uniform 
and across-the-board and often pre-matured liberalization and intensified their 
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liberalization efforts in the 1990s. Consequently, half of the sample countries, mostly low 
income ones, have faced de-industrialization. Even in some cases where manufactured 
exports grew extremely fast, e.g. Mexico, MVA did not accelerate and little upgrading of 
the industrial base took place. During 1990s Mexico achieved annual average growth rate 
of manufactured exports of about 30 per cent, yet its corresponding growth rate of MVA 
did not exceed beyond 4 per cent as against an average of 7.5 per cent for Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore (Shafaeddin, 2005.a, table 2.1) and its own MVA 
growth rate of about 7 per cent in 1960s. Notwithstanding its deep reform and significant 
inflow of FDI, Brazil’s exports of manufactured goods and MVA grew only by 5.4 per 
cent and 1.1 per cent a year, respectively during the same period. Despite two decades of 
reform, Ghana’s growth in MVA was significantly negative during 1990s (-35 percent). 
Further, the liberalization efforts did not encourage exports of manufactured goods 
beyond some wood processing the production capacity of which in fact remained still 
below the level of mid-1970s( ibid:46-48). Although the growth performance in both 
Ghana and Brazil has somewhat improved in last few years, the sustainability of recovery 
is questionable as their investment has not picked up much.  
 The reform programmes designed by IFIs failed to simulate private investment, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector; the I/GDP ratio fell even where the inflow of 
FDI was considerable-e.g. in the case of a number of Latin American countries including 
Brazil While, trade liberalization changed the structure of incentives in favour of exports, 
the balance between risks and return changed against the manufacturing sector. In 
contrast to traditional MS, the outward orientation strategies reduced the incentive for 
investment in manufacturing sector due to reduction in its profit margin resulting from 
import liberalization. At the same time, it increased the risks of investment due to 
increased competition in the domestic market and the lack of sufficient market 
information and marketing channels for exports. 
Generally speaking, in the “majority cases” trade liberalization has led to the 
development and re-orientation of the industrial sector in accordance with static 
comparative advantage. Resource-based industries and some labour intensive activities, 
such as assembly operations, expanded in most countries and little up-grading took place. 
At the same time some labour intensive industries shut down leading to significant lay 
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offs. The performance of two categories of industries was, however, exceptional. These 
include industries that were near maturity and/or those which had been dynamic during 
the import substitution era. Both categories continued to be dynamic in terms of 
production, exports and investment. For example, the aerospace industry in Brazil, 
benefited from liberalization as the competitive pressure that emerged made it more 
efficient despite the initial difficulties it encountered (Shafaeddin, 2006.a) . Otherwise, 
many industries were destroyed without necessarily leading to the emergence of new 
ones.  
The mixed results obtained from the above-mentioned study and the historical 
experience of successful cases prompted the author to conclude that there is a need for an 
alternative approach to trade and industrial policies as comparative advantage has to be 
created; it is not god given.  
 
VII: A framework for development oriented trade and industrial policies 
 
We do not intend to present a blueprint for trade and industrial policies, industrialization, 
upgrading and economic development in general. Each country’s particular situation has 
to be taken into account. Nevertheless, drawing on the experiences of both early and late 
industrializers, some elements of an alternative trade and industrial policy can be 
outlined: trade policy should be development-oriented, country specific, based on the 
realities of the international market, and allow for the dynamic and changing relative 
roles of market, firms and governments in co-ordinating economic activities over time. 
Further, they should be selective, mixed, dynamic and predictable in nature; pay attention 
to the complementary role of ‘non-price factors’ and agriculture. Trade policies should 
enhance productivity rather than relying on repeated devaluation.  Finally, FDI should be 
used selectively and effective management of capital flows should be ensured.  
 
Development orientation 
Trade policy is a means to achieving the general development objective of a country 
including building up supply capacity and industrialization. So are, in fact, international 
trade, market, industrial policies, FDI, technology, etc. The “means” and “ends” or 
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objectives should not be confused. Therefore, trade policy is not necessarily synonymous 
with trade liberalization and success in “liberalization”, or “protection”, per se is not a 
guarantee of “success” in development.  
Following Myrdal (1971:356) we define development as “the movement of the 
whole social system upward”. Therefore, it is a dynamic process involving, inter alia, not 
only growth but also raising of the standard of living of the masses of population and 
providing them with employment. Trade policy should help achieving these objectives. 
Export expansion should not take place simply for exports’ sake. The aim of export 
development and competitiveness is not to keep wages and other income of citizens low; 
otherwise, ends are sacrificed for means (Paus 1989). Similarly, integration to the world 
economy should not take place for the sake of integration .Wade (2005) correctly argues 
that development is more about internal integration than external integration. Internal and 
external integration should reinforce each other as external integration is beneficial if 
only it contributes to internal integration (Wade, 2005: 94-5).  
Specialization on the basis of theory of comparative cost advantage is necessary 
to begin with the process of industrialization, but if a country stops at producing and 
exporting labour intensive and resource based industries, those objectives will not be met 
in the long-run. In order to covert the industrial sector “into gradual acquisition of 
retainable industry” there is a need for upgrading of the industrial structure in accordance 
with dynamic comparative advantage (Gomery and Baumol, 2000:71). Such advantage 
is, however, “made not given”, and it will not be achieved through the operation of 
market forces alone. A country can develop comparative advantage in an industry of its 
own choice through Government action (Cline 1983:155-56)  
To achieve dynamic comparative advantage and serve the purpose of 
development, therefore at any point in time, trade policy may comprise protection 
accorded to some industries though tariffs and/or quantitative restrictions, payments of 
subsidies, or any other measures necessary to achieve the objectives of development. At 
the same time it may also include liberalization of trade in some other goods as 
appropriate. 
 
International market structure and the “competence gap” 
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The design of trade policy should be based on the realities of the international 
market and the specific condition of each country rather than on some theoretical 
abstraction. In a world where the characteristics of the market are different from the 
premises of trade liberalization hypotheses, relying on market forces alone will not lead 
to the achievement of dynamic comparative advantage. In such a world international 
prices are distorted by the activities and interests of large oligopolistic firms, 
governments of industrial countries, mal-distribution of income and assets among 
developed and developing countries and by the tastes and technologies possessed by the 
former. Further, as mentioned before, the increasing market concentration, the growing 
technological competence gap between developing and industrialized countries and other 
developments in the world economy have increased the role of knowledge and experience 
in industrialization. Thus the period of learning has prolonged. In such a world, the need 
for infant industry support has increased. Some support is initially required for 
penetrating into international market. Whether the necessary support should be provided 
through protection or subsidization of output, or factors of production, is a secondary 
issue. The main point is that infant industry support is needed not only for import 
substitution but also for export promotion. For a newcomer, the unit cost of production is 
high not only in industries subject to economies of scale, but also in all other industries 
due to the lack of experience and knowledge (Fontaine 1992). Their infant industry 
support is therefore unavoidable. List (1865), Mill (1965), Stiglitz(1996), Wade (1990) 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), Redding(1999), Buffie (2001), Senghaas(1989) and 
Shafaeddin (1995.a and 2005.a) are among those who have argued in favour of 
temporary and selective infant industry protection.  
 
Country specificity 
There is no universal rules and blueprint for trade policy as mentioned earlier in this 
section. Economic policies, including reform programmes need to be geared to each 
country’s needs, the degree of market development, initial industrial capacity, level of 
development, development objectives and socio-economic characteristics. In each point 
in time, for developing countries with little or no industrial capacity, such as the low-
income countries that are mostly located in Africa, the vital issue is to develop supply 
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capacity and to lay the foundation for expanding export. For countries which have 
already undertaken some degree of import substitution, such as some Latin American and 
the Middle Eastern ones, the main requirement is to make their industries efficient and 
competitive and to expand exports. The challenge for those with some export capacity – 
the NIEs – is to develop their technological capabilities to upgrade their industrial 
structure in order to exploit new opportunities in the domestic and international markets.  
 The existence of “competence gap”, risks involved in new activities and 
prevalence of positive externalities related to training and skill development were the 
main argument put forward by F. List (1856), the founder of theory of temporary infant 
industry protection, who challenged the classical theory of trade. Nevertheless, his 
emphasis was on the need for taking into account the industrial capacity and other 
specific conditions of each country. The aim of protection according to him is to develop 
the “productive power” of a newcomer country which lags behind early industrializers. 
But the development of the productive power of a nation depends mainly on development 
of “mental capital” [human capita] which in turn depends on specific soci-economic, 
institutional and moral factors, etc. (see Shafaeddin, 2005.b, for more details).  
It is interesting to note that although he was a classical economist, J.S. Mill 
fully endorsed the infant industry argument on the basis of the same reasoning 
provided by List (competence gap, risks, externalities) and referred to country 
specificity as is evident from the following passage.23 Mill also adopted a dynamic 
perspective on comparative advantage requiring government intervention. 
The only case in which, on mere principles of political economy, protecting 
duties can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily (especially in a 
young and rising nation) in hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself 
perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country. The superiority of one 
country over another in a branch of production often arises only from having 
begun it sooner. There may be no inherent advantage on one part, or 
disadvantage on the other, but only a present superiority of acquired skill and 
experience. A country which has this skill and experience yet to acquire, may in 
other respects be better adapted to the production than those which were earlier 
in the field; and besides, it is a just remark of Mr. Rae, that nothing has a greater 
tendency to promote improvements in any branch of production than its trial 
under a new set of conditions. But it cannot be expected that individuals should, 
at their own risk, or rather to their certain loss, introduce a new manufacture, and 
bear the burden of carrying it on until the producers have been educated up to 
the level of those with whom the processes are traditional. A protecting duty, 
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continued for a reasonable time, might sometimes be the least inconvenient 
mode in which the nation can tax itself for the support of such an experiment 
(Mill 1965: 918-19). 
 
The role of market, firms and government  
The market definitely has a role to play in the process of industrialization and 
development. Nevertheless; it can deal only with gradual and marginal changes. It is 
“inadequate” on its own to accelerate growth of supply capacity, promote dynamic 
comparative advantage and upgrade technological capabilities. There is a need for 
government intervention. Moreover, “...there is no way that the government can avoid 
forming a ‘vision’ of where the economy is going” (Stiglitz, 2005:29).  
The price mechanism is slow to create market and develop “non-price factors”. 
By non-price factors we mean institutions, infrastructure, information and back-up 
services necessary for the efficient operation of  markets. The response to incentives will 
be limited especially when non-price factors are lacking. The market also fails to make 
inefficient industries efficient and competitive, particularly through shock therapy, i.e. by 
sudden and drastic trade liberalization. Large and sudden changes in the price structure 
create uncertainty.  
Similarly, technological upgrading is not an automatic process. It involves a 
learning process for generating specific technical and managerial skills in the chain of 
production and distribution. Technological learning requires time and experience; it is 
costly and involves risks as well as externalities. It necessitates a deliberate effort and a 
systemic and comprehensive approach to policies and actions at all levels: enterprises, 
sectors, national and international.  
Learning plays a vital role in industrialization,24 and takes various forms: learning 
by studying and training; learning-by-doing; learning-by-using, imitating and adapting; 
learning by experience; and most of all learning by trial and error. While learning has to 
be promoted at various level of the economy, specialized capabilities are developed at the 
firm and activity levels. It is efficient firms which are able to export, as knowledge and 
skills are firm-specific and activity-specific. Hence, not only functional intervention, 
through education, but also selective and targeted interventions are required by the 
government to promote specific skill and learning at the industry and activity levels. 
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Although there is a risk of government failure, this is not an argument in favour of 
leaving everything to the mercy of market forces. After all, market is not and cannot be 
the only coordination mechanism. The coordination of economic activities at both 
domestic and international levels takes place through a “coordination system” 
(Shafaeddin 2004.a); that is the combination of markets, state and firms, complemented 
and supported by “non-price factors”. Nevertheless, in contrast to the orthodox approach 
according to which firms are passive, the firm is the driving force in such a coordination 
system, around which the other coordination mechanisms operate. Hence, government 
action and policies, should complement the market, it should not replace it. 
The relative role of each element of the coordination system and the degree of the 
interaction among various mechanisms vary from one country to another and in each 
country over time, depending on the level of development, structural, historical and 
socio-political conditions of the country, and on the interrelation among various sectors 
of the economy. Similarly, the role of the private and public sectors may change over 
time, although close cooperation between the two is essential throughout the process of 
development. 
In each country and in each period, the relative role of each element of the 
coordination system also depends on the existence of various markets and the degree of 
market failure which is, inter alia, influenced by the nature and the degree of 
development of “non-price factors”. At the early stages of their development, developing 
countries face a dilemma, because all coordination mechanisms run a high risk of failure. 
Market failure is pervasive because of the lack, or underdevelopment of markets; the risk 
of entrepreneurship failure is large because of the lack of experienced entrepreneurs and 
underdevelopment of the formal sector; the risk of government failure is significant 
because of the low capacity of the bureaucracy. The lower the level of development, the 
higher is the risk of coordination failure. Moreover, there is a vicious circle. The country 
is underdeveloped because of the failure of the coordination mechanisms, the 
coordination mechanisms fail because of the low level of development. To break this 
circle, action should be taken on all fronts: to create or improve markets, to increase the 
organizational capacity of entrepreneurs, to develop the necessary infrastructure and 
institutional framework of the country and to increase the capacity of the State. 
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Nevertheless, to break the vicious circle, initially the key role is to be played by 
government. As we mentioned earlier in this paper, market forces per se will develop 
neither the market nor the “non-price factors” rapidly. During the early stages of 
development, the direct participation of the public sector in industrialization may become 
essential, particularly in areas where the private sector is not prepared to invest because 
of existence of high risks or in industries which involve significant externalities. As the 
private sector and the market develop, public ownership and the role of the government 
may gradually be reduced. Experience, however, indicates that the development of 
infrastructure, institutions and back-up services and provision of information cannot be 
left to the private sector entirely because of the need for significant overhead investment 
and involvement of externalities. Further, “Government could, in principle, enhance the 
efficiency of the market” (Stiglitz2005.: 25) and make it more development friendly 
(Wade, 2005, Lall 2004, Stiglitz, 2005 and Shafaeddin, 2004.a) .Yet more, the 
“government has the responsibility, and the opportunity, for shaping the economic 
environment” (Stiglitz, 2005:31)  
It is sometimes argued that even if the application of industrial policy of one type 
or another is justified, the capacity of the state in developing countries is insufficient for 
their efficient implementation. It is partly for this reason that, it is argued, the East Asian 
experience is not replicable in other countries. A couple of points worth mentioning in 
this respect. Firs, the state capacity of many developing countries today is not necessarily 
inferior to that of Republic of Korea, or Thailand, in 1950s and 1960s. Second, even if it 
were the capacity of the state can be improved, but missing market will not develop by 
itself and market failures will not correct themselves automatically. Third, and more 
important, there is a contradiction in the logic used in the argument on the capacity of the 
state in developing countries. Wade correctly states that:  
“…ironically, the world is proceeding on the assumption, in the TRIPS 
agreement, that developing country states do have a considerable capacity to 
enforce patents and copyrights. It is not obvious that a state that can do this would 
not also be able to implement effective protection and other forms of policy” 
(Wade, 2005:94).25  
 
Hence, the key issue in development of an efficient coordination system, 
particularly for countries at early stages of industrialization and development is to 
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improve the learning capacity and efficiency of the government machinery in 
formulating, implementing and correcting its policies. It is not easy but feasible, as the 
experience of both early industrializers and NIEs indicate. Since design of trade and 
industrial policies differ from one country to another, nobody knows what the “right 
policy” might be (as nobody knows what the “right prices” are) exactly in each specific 
case. It is a question of trial and error – of learning by doing. This is why the learning 
capacity of the government is vital indeed. 
Therefore, it is a fallacy that there is no, or limited, role for government in the 
process of industrialization. Some government intervention is required to compensate for 
market deficiencies and inadequacies, to build up and upgrade production capacity, 
whether or not for export, to create markets, to establish complementary “non-price 
factors” and to correct market failure. Furthermore, the market is a “servant” – the means 
– and not a “master”. As prices are to serve the long-term objectives of development, a 
wrong, i.e. distorted short-term price structure may be the right one if it serves to achieve 
the long-term objective of dynamic comparative advantage (Fontaine 1992, Amsden 
1989 and Paus 1989).  
In other words, the question is not “market or government”: it is to what extent 
the government should intervene, in what form; and how the efficiency of the 
government intervention could be improved to minimize government and market failures. 
Nevertheless, unnecessary, rigid and prolonged government intervention in the economy 
should be avoided; the government should not replace the market when it operates well.  
 
Features of trade and industrial policies 
Trade and industrial policy should be selective, mixed, dynamic, and predictable and 
supplemented by development of “non-price factors” and agriculture. The scarcity of 
resources, existence of market failure, different externalities and different learning effects 
and linkages in different industries would imply that industrial development should start 
on a selective basis. Some consumer goods that are most commonly in demand in the 
internal market and which preferably also involve significant learning effects could be 
chosen as a first group of industries for capacity building. Whereas the final products of 
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selected industries are protected, imported inputs for these industries should be free of 
duties. 
The provision of protection to the selected industry should not, however, be given 
without conditions and without limit. The government should insist on performance in 
exchange for the incentives and sanction the industrialists in cases where their 
performance is not satisfactory. In other words, any industrial strategy should embody 
elements of both rewards and pressure from the government, market or both. As firms 
develop their production capacity, the government should introduce or gradually increase 
the pressure of competition in the internal market by allowing new entrants to the field. In 
industries where economies of scale are important, however, the competitive pressure 
should not be at the cost of production at an inefficient scale. One criterion for 
performance should be cost reduction and quality improvement.  
F. List clearly spoke of providing rewards and prizes in addition to tariffs or subsidies 
to enterprises which perform well in terms of product quality improvement, efficiency, 
acquisition of knowledge etc. and introduce pressure on industries which are provided 
with incentives:  
 
If a government observes that manufacturers are producing goods lower in quality 
and higher in price than those made abroad and if it is satisfied that this is the fault of 
the local industrialists it should offer substantial prizes as a reward to those 
manufacturers who, within a specified period, are able to make goods which approach 
those made abroad in quality and price. The ability to manufacture such goods 
regularly should also be considered when awarding prizes. Acceptance of such an 
award should be conditional upon a firm allowing workers employed elsewhere to 
visit its factory so as to improve their technical knowledge. (F. List quoted in Ho, 
2005: 739). 
Similarly: 
Should a government decide that manufacturers have failed to make products which are 
as good as those made abroad simply because they have not been able to secure the 
services of a sufficient number of hardworking skilled men it should offer prizes to 
workers who reach a high standard of technical skill. It should also offer prizes to firms 
which, in a particular period, have succeeded in attracting foreign workers of proven skill 
and reliability into their employment. (ibid, 740.). 
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According to List, the pressure on enterprises to perform is applied first through the 
introduction of domestic competition followed by gradual import liberalization (see 
Shafaeddin, 2005.b for details). 
Almost all successful industrializers applied some sort of performance 
requirement, or “control mechanism” to discipline the protected industries or manage the 
foreign companies. For example, in East Asian countries subsidies were provided in 
exchange for performance including export performance (Amsden, 2005and 2001)). As 
far as FDI is concerned, in Japan and other East Asian countries the right of foreign firms 
to sell in the domestic market was linked to the increase in production of parts and 
components or, in the case of Thailand, for hiring local managers (Amsden, 
2005:222).USA and other developed countries also have applied requirement of one kind 
or another even during 1990s (Kumar, 2005:182-5). Amsden distinguishes three major 
types of performance standards: 
First, techno-standards [which] ties subsidies … to the professionalization of 
managerial practices. Second, policy standards[which]ties subsidies to the 
promotion of major national strategic priorities, such as maintaining price 
stability, increasing local content, raising the level of exports and not worsening 
income distribution. Third, both types of performance standards, as they operate 
in the arena of science and technology, [and which] are designed to increase 
national skill formation and the generation of firm-specific knowledge-based 
assets (Amsden, 2005:227).  
 
To continue, as domestic capacity is developed in an industry, all measures should 
be taken to allow the firms involved to enter into the foreign market rapidly. At this stage 
the relevant firms need to improve efficiency and quality if they are to compete in the 
internal and international markets. But the disadvantages of cost, external economies in 
market search and marketing, lack of experience in exporting and marketing and risks 
related to entry barriers require “infant export protection/support” through export 
subsidy, tax holiday and/or fiscal incentives. Infant industry support is not confined to the 
import substitution phase of production. Government intervention should be more evident 
during the second stage of infancy, i.e. when the infant industry starts to cut into the 
international market.  
Once again incentives should be provided in exchange for performance – this time 
for export performance. One policy practised in Japan and other East Asian countries was 
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to give preference in the allocation of foreign exchange for the import of inputs to those 
firms which showed satisfactory export performance.  
The enterprises must be made to know in advance that infant industry support 
during its first and second phases is temporary. They should also know the schedule of 
the phase out of this support. The pressure for improved efficiency should eventually take 
the form of gradual liberalization of imports of final goods. 
While the first group of industries go through the second infancy phase, an 
attempt should be made to use their exports proceeds for a parallel development of the 
second group of industries; again on a selective basis. These industries may include some 
other consumer goods and/or intermediate inputs used in the production of the first group 
of industries. A system of drawbacks should apply to the products of these industries 
when they are exported. As the second group of industries matures in the production 
process, some sophisticated and durable consumer goods, some inputs to the second 
group of industries and some machinery used in production of the first group could be 
added to the list of infant industries for support. Eventually, some of these industries 
become subject to infant export protection. 
Infant export protection/support also takes place on a selective basis for each 
group of industries which, over time, would themselves be subject to the same modalities 
as that of the first group. The choice of machinery may be influenced by the size of the 
country and the type of existing industries. The process of deepening industrialization 
could continue until an industrial base is established, export capabilities developed and 
capacities for efficient production of machinery are acquired. During such a process for 
each industry while the role of government intervention is gradually reduced, the 
responsibilities of the firms and the role of the market are increased. Inter-firm relations, 
through trade and industrial associations, could be developed to help undertake these 
responsibilities. Clustering of industries would be useful to exploit externalities in 
institutions, infrastructure, marketing, skill development, etc. Nevertheless, clustering 
also requires support and guidance from the government. A close government-business 
relationship for drawing and implementing the related rules and guidelines would 
facilitate the process of industrialization and interchange of information. 
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For example, if textiles were chosen as a first group of industries for industrial 
development, in the first phase textiles would be supported and supplied with a free flow 
of imports of yarn and machineries. In the second phase the protection of production 
should be gradually reduced, but assistance and incentives should be provided to promote 
exports of textiles. In this phase, exports can be accompanied with import substitution of 
yarns. Ultimately, assistance to exports of textiles should be reduced to zero as the 
industry matures and penetrates into the international market. In the meantime textile 
machines can be produced domestically and possibly be exported. When a number of 
industries are developed in this manner over time, the related process is said to resemble 
“flying geese”, an expression first used in the context of Japanese industrialization. 
Nonetheless, almost all successful industrializers followed more or less a similar 
process.26
Not all industries selected for import substitution could be necessarily candidates 
for exportation. Nonetheless, this should not imply that protection should continue for 
ever, the industries developed through import substitution should be made efficient so 
that they could compete at least in the domestic market. 
As the industrial base widens the expansion of investment in production and 
export capacity takes on more importance. Specialization in production and exports of 
standard manufactured goods is subject to the fallacy of composition if a large number of 
developing countries produce similar products. Therefore, to avoid terms of trade losses 
the industrial deepening should follow industrial widening. Industrial deepening requires 
the upgrading of products and the production process, quality improvement, and 
introduction of new products or a new variety of the same products. This process requires 
a technological innovation which is different from innovation at early stages of 
industrialization. At the early stages, innovation could take the form of introducing and 
operating a new machine or imitation and adaptation of technologies to local conditions. 
Innovation required for upgrading the industrial structure, necessitate R&D and 
eventually development of new and frontier technology. The development of new 
technology in turn necessitates “infant” support because of the risks and dynamic external 
economies of learning involved. 
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To exemplify the evolution of dynamic and mixed trade policy over the period of 
industrilization, we have presented the example of tariffs, as an instrument of trade 
policy, in table 3(Note that the figures provided are only for the purpose of exposition). 
As can be seen, in each phase some industries are protected and others benefit from free 
trade; an industry will not be subject to protection permanently, after a while it will be 
liberalized gradually; the average tariff rate for the manufacturing sector rises first before 
declining and reaching zero eventually.  
Insert table 3 her 
Hence, for sometime a combination of import substitution, export promotion; 
infant industry support and import liberalization is at work for a mix of consumer goods, 
intermediate products and capital goods. Nevertheless, there is no “quick fix”. 
Industrialization is a long and tedious process. It took over 250 years in the case of Great 
Britain and over 200 years in the case of USA and Japan. 
In short, the framework for trade and industrial policies which we have proposed 
is not a récepi for protection; on the contrary it is a means of industrialization before 
liberalizing trade completely. As F. List stated nearly two century ago: “..restrictions are 
but means, and liberty, in its proper sense is an end” (List, 1856:64). What he implies is: 
we should first aim at liberty from underdevelopment, then liberty from trade restriction. 
 
Foreign direct Investment and capital flows 
The experience of developing countries indicates that FDI can acts as an important 
channel for export. It may also make a notable contribution to financing investment 
temporarily. Nonetheless its longer term contribution would be often limited in relation to 
total domestic investment and would involve little technological spill over (Gallagher and 
Zarsky, 2004, Huang, 2000, Grether, 1999, Buitelaar and Pérez, 2000, Moltimore, 2000 
and Hanson 2001). The recent experience of China indicates that FDI could play an 
important role in industrialization, by contributing to the skill development of local 
manpower and expansion of domestic value added, if it is guided and targeted toward 
specific areas where foreign technology is most needed. In fact, China’s experience, 
unlike Mexico’s, would teach us that one could think of a process of export promotion 
through FDI that could eventually lead to import substitution if it is managed by the 
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Government (Pizarro and Shafaeddin 2006). China started assembly operation in a 
number of industries, particularly electronics and telecommunication, based on imported 
input and gradually has been increasing domestic production and exports of components 
(Shafaeddin 2004b). For example, the share of components in exports of manufactured 
goods (excluding chemicals) of the country increased from about 6.4 per cent in 
1992/1993 to 14.5 per cent in 1997/1998; and, 16.7 per cent in 2002/2003 after the 
accession to WTO. More importantly, the corresponding share of imports of components, 
which had increased continuously between 1992/1993 until 1997/1998 from 17.7 per cent 
to 23.2 per cent, first increased more slowly (reaching nearly 24 per cent in 2000/2001) 
and then declined to 22.3 per cent in 2002/2003 despite the accession to WTO.27(Pizarro 
and Shafaeddin, ibid). 
Finally, capital flows should be also controlled and managed. Otherwise, erratic 
movement in capital flows will lead to erratic changes in the flow of imports, the 
exchange rate, interest rate, production cost, and the price structure. The ensuing chaos 
and confusion makes the price structure and the exchange rate lose their function as a 
guide to investment for the expansion of output and export, thus leading to instability in 
all significant economic variables – including MVA and GDP. In particular, the 
instability in the flow of imports would also severely affect the growth of MVA and 
GDP.28 In fact, in violently changing conditions and for large maladjustments, exchange 
rate devaluation may be harmful and would not be desirable (Arndt 1988 and Henderson 
1948).  
 
Limits of devaluation 
Devaluation of the local currency can temporarily provide some incentives for the 
production of tradeable goods, particularly exports.29 It may also serve other purposes 
but, for a number of reasons, it is not necessarily the most desirable measure as a tool of 
industrial policy when it is used repeatedly. First, it is used as a tool of uniform (nominal) 
price changes over the whole range of tradeable goods rather than for selected products.30 
Supply response to prices is much lower when all the outputs of a sector are equally 
affected; it is stronger when relative prices increase only for one good, or for a few goods 
(Streeten 1987). Even in industrialized countries there is some evidence that reallocation 
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of resources from non-tradable to tradable sectors, and within tradables from importables 
to exportables (and in the latter from traditional to new products), might be more 
responsive to targeted incentives such as subsidies than to exchange rate adjustment 
(Schydlowsky 1982).  
Second, the direct impact of devaluation on production cost in manufacturing 
products, particularly exports, is greater than on the other sectors of the economy because 
of their higher import intensity which has, in fact, increased significantly due to import 
liberalization. Industrial production in low income countries, in particular, is dependent 
on imports often for more than half its inputs. Therefore, in countries with a high ratio of 
imports to GDP, where manufactures are a small fraction of total exports and the 
manufacturing sector is highly import-intensive, incentives for exports of manufactures 
should be provided by other measures than devaluation. These may include e.g. subsidies, 
tax holidays and other fiscal and financial measures targeted to particular industries. 
Further, the indirect contribution of devaluation on the cost of production in the 
manufacturing sector could be also higher than the other sectors if devaluation is 
accompanied by, or result in, a decline in productivity in this sector due to supply or 
demand factors or a combination of both. When devaluation involves contractionary 
effects,31 or is accompanied by contractionary macroeconomic management, the demand 
for domestically produced goods will be reduced. Similarly, export may not increase in 
response to devaluation when the structure of supply is rigid, when export supply is 
constrained by import compression or low quality and inappropriate product for foreign 
markets, or when there is the lack of marketing channels. Similarly, export may not 
increase much because of low price elasticity of demand or recession abroad. As a result, 
the combination of reduced effective domestic demand and little or no expansion in 
export may lead to lower capacity utilization and a decline in productivity. The neglect of 
the need for enhancing productivity and the overemphasis on devaluation has been 
important weaknesses of the neo-liberal reform programmes.  
Third, devaluation could disrupt the economy through its inflationary impact, 
particularly in low-income countries. In fact, we have estimated that for every 10 per cent 
nominal devaluation during the period 1980–1987, in countries where per capita income 
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was less than $400 (in 1986), the real exchange rate declined only by 3 per cent within a 
year (Shafaeddin1992; see also Edward and Wijnbergen 1989).32
Fourth, devaluation, as well as import liberalization, tends to turn the domestic 
terms of trade in favour of primary commodities and against the manufacturing sector 
because of differences in the nature of price determination in the two sectors (Shafaeddin 
1991)33. While this may have a welcome positive effect on food production, it would 
seem that cash crops have benefited more than foods in many developing countries which 
have applied structural adjustment programmes (Stewart et al. 1992). Further, 
simultaneous currency devaluation by a large number of countries that produce the same 
commodity may result in terms-of-trade losses and decline in real wages due to the 
“fallacy of composition”. 
Finally, the available empirical evidence indicates that other factors are more 
important in export competitiveness than exchange rate and costs and prices. For 
example, Fagerberg (1988) has shown that the contribution of cost competitiveness 
resulting from low wages was far less than technological competitiveness and the ability 
to compete on delivery (ibid.371). An empirical study by Kaldor (1978) for the period  
1963–1975 indicates that countries with the fastest rate of growth of exports, e.g. Japan 
were those which at the same time experienced faster rates of increase in their relative 
unit labour cost (RULC) than others. On the basis of this study he also concluded that in 
the long run relative changes in exchange rate can be the result of competitiveness, rather 
than its cause. Thus, he added, relying on changes in RULC alone as a policy tool for 
improving competitiveness would be a simplistic view.34 Amendola et al. (1993) reached 
similar results for the period 1967–1987.35
In the long run, enhancing productivity rather than repeated nominal devaluation 
is a key to success in industrialization as mentioned earlier. Nonetheless, with the 
presence of strategically active international firms, the concept of productivity takes on a 
different meaning. It is not merely concerned with the volume of output produced. It 
involves creating value to the consumers through factors which contribute to the lowering 
of the price elasticity of demand. Such are, for example, a reputation for reliability, the 
supply of high quality products, timely and rapid deliveries, etc. Productivity 
enhancement requires continuous learning, skill development, innovation and upgrading. 
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 The role of “non-price factors” and other influences 
Trade and industrial policy alone cannot succeed unless they are accompanied by a host 
of other factors. The process of industrialization requires what we call “COU-Ps-INs” 
(Shafaeddin, 2006.b) and development of agriculture. COU stands for: Create capacity, 
Operate it efficiently and Upgrade the industrial structure. To do so incentives is 
necessary but not sufficient. There is a need for a number of INs and Ps. The INs include 
Investment, Input, Infrastructure, not only transport and communication but also other 
facilities such as marketing channels, distribution network etc.; Institutions, Innovation 
and Information (Streeten 1987). We use information here in its wide sense of the term 
which includes knowledge, science as well as market information which requires 
investment in human resources through education, skill and training. In fact, investment 
is essential for all other INs as well as for the expansion of supply capacity and creation 
of organizational capabilities and learning. Most of INs outlined here are elements of 
“non-price factors” mentioned earlier. 
The Ps stands for Political stability, Predictability of policies, Participation by the 
citizens in the process of development and Pressure for performance as previously 
explained. There are also two INs which are to be avoided. These are instability in 
exchange rates and inflation which are largely related to agricultural development, 
devaluation of the currency, capital flows and macroeconomic policies.  
Development of agriculture is essential, particularly during the early stages of 
industrialization, to increase the supply of food, where feasible, in order to contribute to 
the availability of wage goods and to ease the pressure on the balance of payments and 
ease inflationary tendencies. For the same reason, an ample availability of other basic 
consumer goods is also important, as availability of wage goods not only eases inflation, 
but also contributes to competitiveness of manufactured goods in the international 
market.  
 
      VIII. Some Concluding Remarks 
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The alternative approach we have proposed above looks idealistic as it is not in 
conformity with WTO rules, the “Washington Consensus” and the practices of IFIs and 
main bilateral donors in their dealings with developing countries. Nevertheless, the 
existence of such rules, Consensus and practices are not an argument against what is 
required for achieving industrialization and development. These rules are not God given; 
they can and need to be revised to become conducive to development according to the 
bottom-up approach we have suggested in this study.  
Like Helleiner, “I am realistic enough to recognize that re-conceptualization of 
WTO as a development institution may not happen quickly (although I am fully confident 
that it eventually [my emphasis] will).” It will take time (Helleiner 2000:19).We are also 
well aware that such a reconceptualization will involve hard bargaining since experience 
has shown that developed countries will not give in purely on moral grounds (Shafaeddin 
1984). Nevertheless, two points are worth emphasizing. One is the realization by all 
parties involve, particularly developing countries, that there is a need for 
reconceptualization. Fortunately there are signs that the dominant neo-liberal economic 
philosophy propagated by Washington Consensus is shifting in favour of a development 
oriented philosophy. The failure of the American States in Buenos Aires in late October-
early November 2005 to agree on American Free Trade Area of America (FTAA) 
proposed initially by the USA in 1994, is one example. The difficulties encountered in 
international trade negotiations since the WTO meeting in Seattle is another. It has 
become evident that developing countries do not bow to pressure easily any more. They 
are better informed and better prepared than they were during the Uruguay Round 
although they continue to be bullied by developed countries. Further, their experience of 
trade liberalization during the last two decades must have been influential in removing 
their illusions about benefits of universal and across-the-board trade liberalization.  
The second point is that developing countries do have some bargaining power in 
international trade. After all they absorb about 23 per cent of exports of developed 
countries (when intra-trade of the EU is excluded, the figure reaches well over 30 per 
cent).36 The question is how to mobilize these bargaining chips and strengthen their 
negotiation position (Shafaeddin 1984). 
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A detailed redesign of WTO rules and other international trade and industrial 
policies relevant to developing countries37 has to be a subject of a separate paper. 
Nevertheless, a couple of general points are worth mentioning with respect to a required 
framework for an international trade policy. First of all, the whole philosophy behind 
WTO rules, as well as practices of IFIs, needs change. It is not “policy space” as such 
within the existing framework of WTO rules that developing countries require. What is 
needed is a totally different approach and framework which allows for a mixed, flexible 
and dynamic trade policy with a broader dimension of space and time rather than one 
which is a one-size-for-all and for-all-time. This dimension of space would imply that 
trade policy should allow for different levels of development and industrialization of the 
various countries at each point in time as a rule and not as exceptions to the rules, i.e. not 
in the way it is sometimes requested by developing countries within the context of the so-
called “special and differential treatment”. For each country at each point in time some 
industries may be protected while some others may be subject to free trade or trade 
liberalization. The dimension of time would imply that the international rules should 
allow for dynamic trade policy of each developing country as the country develops 
leading ultimately to free trade on the line we have explained in this study.  
Second, export performance requirements and domestic content clauses should be 
allowed in the relation between host countries and TNCs. 
Third, while some protection of intellectual property is needed to encourage 
invention and innovation, the TRIPs agreement should be changed in order not to create 
severe barriers to the diffusion of new technology to the firms of developing countries 
because these barriers could render industrial deepening and upgrading difficult. 
In short, the international community should aim at achieving more equitable 
international economic systems and policies in which the needs and different situation of 
countries at different levels and various stages of development are taken into full 
consideration.  
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Table 1: The share of top firms in global production and trade (late 1990s) 
 Activity Number  Per cent 
 
 All output 200  28 
 Industrial output 1000 80 
 World trade 500 70 
 
 
Source:  (Mooney 1999:74). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The importance of the largest* world industrial enterprises  
(in or around 2000) 
 The share of largest firms with employees more 
than 
20,000 
The largest 
Description Total 10,000 Total 100 25 
Number of firms 18,540.0  8.8  5.1  0.5  0.13  
Employees (millions) 100.5  77.7  68.0  27.6  7.30  
Sales (billion dollars) 2,108.4  7.6  66.8  21.7  6.40  
Source: Shafaeddin (2005.a:123). 
* In terms of numbers of employees. 
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Table 3: Evolution of average tariffs for various groups of 
industries at different phases of industrialization 
 
Phase RB&LI LT MT HT Manufactures 
(Average) 
I 20 0 0 0 5 
II 10 40 0 0 12.5 
III 0 30 50 0 12.5 
IV 0 20 40 40 25 
V 0 10 30 40 20 
VI 0 0 15 25 10 
VII 0 0 5 15 5 
VII 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Akyuz (2005: 27) 
 
Notations: 
RB: Resource-based industries 
LI: Labour -intensive industries 
LT: Low-technology-intensive industries 
MT: Medium technology-intensive industries 
HT: High technology-intensive industries 
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Notes 
                                                 
1  The share of parts and components in total exports of manufactured goods increased from 13.2 per cent 
for the period 1981-90 to 18.8 for 1990-2000 (World Bank, 2003.c):55; table 2.2. 
 
2  In 2001 the share of intra-firms trade in total exports of USA and Japan was 37 per cent and 31 per cent, 
respectively. 
 
3 One should add also the higher risks and costs related to instability in exchange rates of main international 
currencies. 
 
4 Another source of external economy is the sheer expansion of the industrial sector as a whole i.e. the 
Marshalian external economy. Nevertheless, this sort of external economies achieves only ex-post as the 
industrial sector develops. 
 
5 Some exceptional limitation on commitments in particular service activities can be acceptable on the basis 
of a clear list . For more details on the three Agreements mentioned above see Wade (2005). 
 
6 If, however, subsidy is provided to an enterprise without being made legally contingent upon export 
performance, it would not be prohibited: “The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which 
export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy…" (ASCM, para. 3.1. a, 
footnote 4). 
 
Remove this line please 
 
 
7  In addition the use of export subsidies is allowed for countries with per capita incomes below $1000. 
 
8 All fifty American states in the USA use subsidies for regional development in order to attract industry 
(Amsden; 2005: 221). In this case it is definitely against the WTO rules as all states can not be 
disadvantaged! 
 
9 See, for example, the text of the G-20 Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 19 March 2005 at the 
conclusion of the Ministerial meeting of G-20 in New Delhi, 18–19 March 2005:  
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo190.htm. 
 
10  The validity clause related to technology which was agreed upon for a trial period of five years was not 
however extended. 
Remove this line please 
11 In addition, countries which are involved in bilateral trade agreements with the USA and EU are subject 
to tougher TRIPS’ standards (Wade, 2005:83-4). 
 
12 See Khor and Yen, 2005:10-12 for details. 
 
13 Five per cent of tariff line can be excepted provided the related imports do not exceed 5 per cent of the 
total value of member’s imports (para 8, annex B of the WTO July Package). 
 
14 The Swiss formula is: T= (a. t)/ (a+t) and R=t/ (a+t) where T and t and a are the new and initial tariff 
rates and constant coefficient, respectively, and R is the rate of tariff reduction (See W TO, 2003:2). 
 
15 Note that the concept of “market inadequacy” is different from “market failure”. (see Arndth 1988). 
 
16 According to the dynamic version of the theory, first introduced by H. Johnson, as production and 
exports of labour intensive products increases, wages will go up and the country will loose comparative 
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advantage in labour intensive products and produce capital intensive goods. The example of East Asia is 
often given for such a development! The theory however assumes that things happen automatically; it is not 
clear how the loses of advantage in labour intensive products should imply gains in advantage in capital 
intensive goods and how the adjustment takes place for creation of  dynamic advantage. 
 
17 For details see Shafaeddin (2005.a:118-133). 
 
18 Note that during this period a number of the countries of the region suffered from the Middle East wars 
directly or indirectly. 
 
19 The USA currently has a number of bilateral free trade agreements with other countries and is in the 
process of negotiating a number of others. 
 
20 For details see Chang,2005.b :30-34) 
 
21  See also various literature by the World Bank and IMF particularly World Bank (1987) and (1993). For 
a brief survey see Shafaeddin (2006.a). 
 
22 For a Survey see Shafaeddin, 2006.a). 
 
23 Alfred Marshal did not object to protection if infant industries, but he was not as supportive as Mill (see 
Shafaeddin, 2005.b for more details.  
 
24 See e.g. Nelson and Winter (1982), Noland and Pack (2003), Lundvall (2004), Westphal (2000), Lall 
(1996) and Lall (2004). 
 
25 Further, if developed countries have recently discovered that protection and industrial policy is not 
justified, how could they explain heavy protection of their agriculture? Similarly how could they explain 
protection of patents for their new products/technologies for as long as 20 years through TRIPS while 
denying developing countries temporary protection of their new-infant-industries, or export products? 
 
26 See Akamatsu (1961), also Kasahara (2004) for a survey. 
 
27 Based on the UN COMTRADE database. 
 
28 Helleiner (1986) has shown that in the case of African countries there was a strong negative relationship 
between instability in the volume of imports and GDP growth rates. 
  
29 For example, Bautista (1982) examining a sample of developing countries for the period 1973–1979 has 
shown that currency depreciation, both small and large, did not lead to a permanent improvement in export 
competitiveness. 
 
30 Nevertheless, for a given rate of nominal devaluation, the implied real exchange rate depreciation will be 
different in different sectors, industries and firms as their import intensities are different. The higher the 
import intensity, the higher the increase in the cost of production for a given rate of nominal devaluation, 
thus the lower the real exchange rate depreciation achieved as a result of a given rate of nominal 
devaluation. Usually the import intensity for manufacturing sector is higher than that for other sectors; 
within the manufacturing sector, it varies from one industry to another and it is higher for modern 
industries and large firms and within these industries it is higher for export production than for the home 
market. Further, for each industry and firm the effective exchange rate could be yet different to the extent 
that the directions of trade of firms are different. Hence, devaluation, as it is claimed, cannot even work as a 
uniform price incentive. To achieve uniform effective exchange rate, a complex nominal rate structure 
would be needed. 
 
31 A study by Edward and Wijnbergen (1989:1526–1528) indicates that the contractionary impact of 
devaluation is important. 
 
32 Edward and Wijnbergen (1989) have shown, on the basis of a survey of the literature, that nominal 
devaluation leads to relatively high real depreciation temporarily, but the effect of nominal devaluation on 
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real exchange rate erodes slowly taking between 8 to 16 quarters depending on the type of macroeconomic 
policies undertaken.  
 
33  The price of primary commodities is demand-determined, but that of manufactured goods is normally 
cost-determined. As a result, devaluation by a small commodity producer changes the domestic price of the 
product without influencing its international price. By contrast, devaluation by the same country changes its 
international (export) price of manufactured goods but does not change its domestic price immediately. Of 
course, the impact of the devaluation on domestic price due to changes in the price of imported input etc 
will ultimately follow as explained in the text. 
 
34 The simultaneous increase in RULC and market share is referred to as the Kaldor paradox in the 
literature.  
 
35 See Fetherston et al. (1977) and Kellman (1983) for similar views expressed for the period 1970s and 
early-1980s. See also Amable and Verspagen (1995). 
 
36 Based on UN, COMTRADE database. 
 
37 For a detailed list of restrictions imposed by international rules and bilateral trade relationships on trade 
and industrial policies of developing countries see, e.g. Rodrik (2004), table 2. 
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